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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
:

STATE OF UTAH,

J
\:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 860101

\

VS.

MARK RENFRO,

J
:

Category No, 2

Defendant-Respondent,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court was
correct in dismissing the charge of arranging to distribute a
controlled substance for value against the defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, Mark Renfro, was charged with arranging to
distribute a controlled substance for value, a third-degree
felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code
Annotated (Supplement 1983) (House Bill No. 241, Amendment
effective April 28, 1986) (R. 14). After a bench trial, the
Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 43-45).

The

State of Utah appealed the Fourth Judicial Court of Utah County,
State of Utah Order of Dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 28, 1985, two undercover officers from Provo City
Police Department went to the defendant's residence in Orem Utah.
There they talked to the defendant about purchasing marijuana.
The defendant went into his bedroom and retrieved a small bag of
1

marijuana from his shaving kit and returned shortly thereafter•
Officer Guynn handed the defendant $100•00 and received two
baggies of marijuana each containing one-half ounce of marijuana.
After the transaction was completed, the officers left the
defendant's residence. (R. 60-62)
At the trial, the Court received the evidence presented by
the State and the defendant did not put on any evidence.
(R. 66). After hearing argument, the Court took the matter under
advisement.

It subsequently issued a revised Memorandum Decision

and Order granting Defendant's request for dismissal on the 29th
day of January, 1986.

(A copy of the Court's decision is

contained in Appendix A in the Respondent's Addendum).

The Court

stated beginning at Paragraph 4 of its Decision:
The Court is persuaded that the evidence establishes
conduct which is clearly in violation of the statute
of the State of Utah governing the distribution for
value of a controlled substance (Section 58-37-8(1)
(a)(ii), as defendant contends, and that the defendant
should have been charged under the offense rather than
with arranging to distribute a controlled substance for
value (Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)...Because of the State's
failure to properly charge the defendant with the
offense of distribution for value rather than arranging,
the Court grants the defendant's Motion to Dismiss...
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's Order should be upheld because the conduct
complained of by the State clearly was in violation of Section
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended, or
distribution for value and not pursuant to Section 58-37-8(1)(a)
(iv) (Supplement 1983) or arranging.

Further, the Supreme Court

has misinterpreted the meaning of the arranging statute pursuant
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to Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supplement 1983).
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
The defendant-respondent agrees with the State that this
brief should be read in conjunction with the State's brief filed
in two other cases having related issues—State v. Fixel, Case
No. 860151 and State v. Fixel, Case No. 860173.

Further it

should be pointed out that the phrase "instead of" was inserted
for the phrase "in lieu of" in Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah
Code Annotated, (1953), as amended, which became effective
April 28, 1986, and therefore, the arranging statute's meaning
has not been changed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE CHARGE FILED
AGAINST DEFENDANT.
It goes without saying and according to 73 Am. Jur. 2nd.
Statutes, Section 295:
Penal statutes are construed with such strictness as to
safeguard the rights of the defendant. If the statute
contains a patent ambiguity and admits of two reasonable and
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor
of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred.
Moreover, penal statutes are not to be extended in their
operation to persons, things, or acts not within their
descriptive terms, or the fair and clear import of the
language used. Nothing can be read into penal statutes
by implication. The fact that the statute may be easily
evaded furnishes no excuse for supplying by judicial
construction that which is palpably omitted therefrom.
These rules prevail even though the court thinks that
the legislature ought to have made the statute more
comprehensive. The application of the rule of strict
construction of criminal statutes is especially
appropriate where intent alone is made the basis of the
crime.
The Court's ruling, however, should be upheld for more basic
3

reasons.

The defendant joins with the State in its brief filed

in the cases

of Fixel

above-mentioned

and respectfully

request

the Court to overrule State vs. Hicken, 659 P.2d 1038 (Utah
1983), State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979) and State v.
Onevaris, 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983).
The dispute revolves around the construction of Section
58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated, (Supplement 1983), as
amended, and its meaning.
The Utah Supreme Court has divided the statute into two
distinct crimes.

That is, the Utah Supreme Court had read the

statute as follows:
To agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute
or dispense a controlled substance for value. To
negotiate to have a controlled substance distributed
or dispensed for value and distribute, dispense,
or negotiate the distribution or dispensing of any
other liquid, substance, or material in lieu of the
specific controlled substance so offered, agreed,
consented, arranged, or negotiated.
That is, the Supreme Court has made two separate crimes out
of this statute by making the alternation i.e. "or," be the
prominent point of division.

The Respondent's position is that

such a division is improper and that the proper division must be
made at the conjunctive, i.e., "and," thereby reading the statute
as one sentence as is set forth in the code which only proscribes
one activity.

In other words, the Respondent's position is that

it is only a violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code
Annotated, (1953), as amended, if there is both an arrangement to
distribute a controlled substance and then in lieu (or instead of
as the law presently reads) the controlled substance so arranged
4

to be distributed a substitution is made for the controlled
substance originally arranged to be distributed/ e.g., marijuana
is arranged to be distributed, but some other substance in lieu
or instead thereof is actually distributed.
According to K. Carter, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC
(1977), at 46-47:
Conjunction. Connecting two statements by inserting
•and1 between them produces a conjunction, and each of
the connecting statements is a conjunct. Consider these
two statements: 15:3 Peter Parker is a student at Cornell.
15:4 Spiderman is now in Ithaca. The following statement
is their conjunction: 15:5 Peter Parker is a student at
Cornell and Spiderman is now in Ithaca. If both (15:3)
and (15:4) are true (15:5) is true: if either conjunct
is false, (15:5) will be false also....Alternation.
Connecting two statements by inserting 'or1 between
them produces an alternation, and each of the connected
statements is an alternative. If we connect (15:3) and
(15:4) with forf instead of with 'and1 we have this
alternation: 15:6 Peter Parker is a student at Cornell
or Spiderman is now in Ithaca. If either (15:3) or (15:4)
is true, (15:6) is true; if both alternatives are false
(15:6) will be false also.11 [Emphasis in the original].
If the letter "A" represents the phrase "To agree, consent,
offer," if the letter "B" represents the phrase "arrange to
distribute or dispense a controlled substance for value," if the
letter "C" represents the phrase "to negotiate to have a
controlled substance distributed for value or dispense for
value," and the letter "D" represents the phrase "distribute,
dispense, or negotiate the distribution or dispensing of any
other liquid, substance, or material in lieu of the specific
controlled substance so offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or
negotiated," then such representations reads (A or B or C and D ) .
The Supreme Court has grouped the aforesaid letters as [(A or B)

5

or (C and D)3.

The Respondent's position is that the logical

construction and grouping should be read [(A or B or C) and p ] .
Therefore^ the construction of the grouping will determine
whether or not a crime has been committed.

That is, under the

Supreme Court's theory if either the letters (A or B) are true a
crime has been committed/ but the defendant's position is that (A
or B or C) must be true and P must also be true before a crime
has been committed*
It can readily been seen by looking at the statute the
Respondent's postion is correct•

The last phrase reads "of any

other liquid/ substance/ or material in lieu of the specific
controlled substance so offered/ agreed/ consented/ arranged/ or
negotiated.w

[Emphasis added]•

If the Supreme Court's position

were correct this phrase would read "material in lieu of the
specific controlled substance so negotiated«w

[Emphasis added]•

It can be seen that as the statute presently readsf the words "so
offered/ agreed/ consented/ arranged/ or negotiated/11 refer to
the phrases identified as (A or B or C) as previously identified
and not merely to the phrase previously identified by the letter
C.
The California case of People v. Brownr 357 P.2d 1072 (1960)
attached hereto as Appendix B dealt with the specific problem in
issue.

Footnote 1 set forth in the Brown case has been

renumbered as Section 11352 of the Uniform Controlled Substance
Act of the California Code and is attached hereto as Appendix C.
Footnote 2 set forth in the Brown case has been renumbered as
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Section 11355 of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act of the
California Code and is attached hereto as Appendix D.
The Brown case dealt with a violation of what is now Section
11352 of the California Code.

It should be noted that Utah does

not have a statute similar to Section 11352 of the California
Coder but Section 58-37-8(7) Utah Code Annotated (1953) , as
amended, deals with conspiracies and attempts*

It also does not

appear that the California Code specifically deals with
conspiracies and attempts under a separate section as does the
Utah Code.
It can be seen that the statute dealt with in the Brown case
under the footnote 2 is now Section 11355 of the California Code
and that Section 11355 of the California Code is the same statute
as Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated (1953) , as
amended.
The Court in Brown noted at page 1074 with reference to the
statute which has now been renumbered Section 11355:
Section 11503 [now Section 11355] makes it a crime
to offer to sell a narcotic and then deliver a substitute. Proposed Section 11509...would have made
it a crime to offer to sell a narcotic coupled with
the acceptance of money, even though there was no
delivery of anything.
In recommending the passage of Section 11503,
[now Section 11355] , the subcommittee stated: [this
section] will be entirely new law. This will cover
the individual who agrees to sell, furnish, transport,
or give away any narcotic, and then delivers some
other liquid, substance or material. These individuals are known to be in a position to violate the
law; but, for some reason, they may feel that they
are dealing with a law enforcement officer and thus
deliver tobacco, water, or some other substance with
the result that they have had the intent to commit
the crime but are testing out the officer.

7

At the present time nothing can be done to that
person, except to charge [him] with 'bunco.1 . ••.
The subcommittee thus made clear its view that
Section 11501 [now Section 11352] did not encompass
an offer to sell a narcotic and subsequent delivery
of a substitute.
The point made in the Brown case is that Section 11352 of
the California Code deals with an offer to sell while Section
11355 of the California Code makes it a crime to offer to sell a
narcotic and the delivery of a substitute.
Additionally, the Brown case notes that specific intent is
required as an essential element of offering to make a sale in
violation of Section 11352 of the California Code.

Although the

issue with regard to the intent required for $ violation of
Section 11355 of the California Code has not been definitely
decided by the California Supreme Court, the case of People v.
Lechlinski, 131 Cal. Rptr. 701, 60 Cal. App. 3d 766 (1976) states
with reference to whether specific intent or general intent is
necessary for a violation of Section 11355 of the Health and
Safety Code, of the California Code that:
We therefore hold that it is immaterial to a
violation of Section 11503 (now 11355) whether
the defendant either before or at the time of
delivery of the non-narcotic substance, intends
to deliver a narcotic or some innocuous material,
this section is violated if there is an offer of
a narcotic and subsequent delivery of a nonnarcotic substance.
It, therefore, appears that Section 11352 of the California
Code requires specific intent in order for there to be a
violation while Section 11355 of the California Code only
requires general intent.

At any rate, Utah does not have a
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statute similar to Section 11352 of the California Code and it
would seem strange to require specific intent for a violation of
Section 58-37-3(1)(a)(iv) in some circumstances while only
requiring general intent in others*

Additionally, in our case,

the defendant made a direct sale and did not offer to sell one
thing and then sell something else in lieu thereof or instead of.
The California case of People v. Shepard, 337 P.2d 214
(1959) dealt with the defendant's claim with what is now Section
11355 of the California Code was unconstitutional as being vague,
uncertain, and unintelligible.

The Court in Shepard noted at

page 127:
A reading of the Section answers the assertions of
the appellant to the effect that it is vague, uncertain and unintelligible. Men of common intelligence do not have to guess at what it means....
There is a reasonably adequate disclosure of the
legislative intent regarding the evil to be
combatted in language giving fair notice of
practices to be avoided....A reading of the Section
discloses that it is a crime for a person to agree
to sell a narcotic to someone, and then to deliver
instead a non-narcotic substance.
The Utah Supreme Court cannot place two interpretations on
the arranging statutes if it intends to uphold the arranging
statute as constitutional.

Either the statute is vague, uncertain,

and unintelligible or it means what it says, i.e., to offer to sell
a narcotic and deliver a substitute instead.

Also note other

states have statutes similar to Utah and other states also do not
have a statute similar to Section 11352 of the California Code.
See Section 453.323 of the Nevada Revised Statutes attached
hereto and incorporated by reference, as Appendix E.
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It should

be pointed out that the apparent reason is that Utah and Nevada
has an attempt and conspiracy statute which California does not
specifically have*
Reading Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended, in accordance with the Supreme Court's prior
interpretation makes Sections 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) and 58-37-8(7),
Dtah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, superfluous and would
additionally appear to cause equal protection violations under
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution together
with Utah Case Law,
California has consistently interpreted Section 11355 of
West's Ann, Health and Safety Code as requiring an offer or
arrangement to sell a narcotic and subsequent delivery of a
substitute and the Utah Court must do the same as being the clear
meaning of the statute.

People v. Lechlinski, 131 Cal, Rptr,

201, 60 Cal. App. 3d 766 (1976); People v, Medina, 103 Cal, Rptr,
721, 27 Cal. App. 3d 473 (1972); People v. Ernst, 121 Cal. Rptr,
857, 48 Cal. App. 3d 785 (1975),
The State of Utah argued in the District Court in the aboveentitled case:
MR. BARRY: Your Honor, if I may speak simply to
defendant's contention. If you'd look at the Information itself, you'll be able to read that the defendant is charged with having knowingly and intentionally
agreed or that he did knowingly and intentionally agree,
offer, consent, arrange or negotiate to distribute for
value marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance.
The crime we are involved here with is: Did he
agree to sell it? Did he consent to sell it? Did he
offer to sell it? It makes no sense at all to say the
defendant is not guilty of this crime because he in
fact delivered the marijuana. What's in marijuana
itself shows in the delivery of the marijuana, shows
itself that he meant it when he said: Yes, I'll sell
you a hundred dollars worth of marijuana. The crime

itself is the agreement to distribute the marijuana*
Delivery of the marijuana shows that he did intentionally make that agreement, that it was a true
agreement and that he meant to follow through with
it, your Honor, It makes no sense at all to claim:
hey, I'm not really guilty because I actually gave
him the marijuana after I got the money* That was
evidence that there was in fact an agreement.
The only way the defendant's contention could
hold up would be in another scenario; for example,
some party shows up and delivers the marijuana with
whom none of the negotiations were made* The
agreement in this case was made specifically between
the undercover officers and this man, namely, that they
would sell a hundred dollars worth of marijuana.
THE COURT: What do you characterize as "distributing for value," what constitutes that crime?
MR. BARRY: This case could be charged either
way, your Honor. (R. 69-70).
The difficulty with the prosecution's approach of course is
that by reading the so called "arranging statute" in such a way
is that it virtually makes the remainder of Section 58-37-8, Utah
Code Annotated (1953), as amended, superfluous.

Such a reading

would make the "arranging statute" overly broad, vague, uncertain
and unintelligible and therefore unconstitutional.
The possibilities are really endless.

Is it a felony for a

person to negotiate the sale of marijuana to himself from police?
If so what is the purpose of the misdemeanor possession section of
the code, Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended?
The State's position in the District Court was all that was
necessary to prove the crime was "did [the defendant] agree to
sell it." (R. 69). If this were the case and without more, the
penalty revolves around what is offered for sale rather than what
is sold.

That is, if a person offers to sell marijuana, the

penalty is different than the penalty for offering to sell
11

cocaine.

And all the state would have to prove through the

testimony of an officer was that a defendant agreed, consented,
or offered to sell one controlled substance as opposed to
another.

No sale need even take place.

How is a defendant

supposed to defend against such a charge as a practical matter
on such evidence?

Does this mean if some eighteen year old

defendant tells an officer on Center Street in Provo, Utah, where
he can buy marijuana, that he is guilty of a third degree felony
without more?
Finally, since the resolution of this case does not involve
a Federal or State constitutional issue, its application should
be prospective only.

Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1981).

It is the Respondents position that the Supreme Court
should review its previous decisions regarding Section 58-37-8(1)
(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated, (1953), as amended, and rule as Judge
Bullock did in State v. Jacobson, Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County, State of Utah, Case No. 7062 hereto attached as
Appendix "F" in order to avoid further confussion in the trial
court*
It is the Respondent's position that this ruling should be
perspective and that the Supreme Court should set forth a rule in
conformity with the case of State v. King, 564 P.2d 767 (Utah,
1976).

In the case of King, the defendant was convicted of the

offense of selling marijuana, and the Court noted, "it is
recognized that if a person is acting as a law enforcement
officer or acts as agent in the sale or purchase of drugs as part
of the law enforcement duties, he would not be guilty of the
12

offense charged.

The test should be whether any defendant is

acting knowingly or unknowingly as an agent for a police officer
or acting as an agent for a person who is selling drugs.

In the

event a person is merely acting as an agent for the police, either
knowingly or unknowingly, and does not gain thereby, he should not
be convicted of a felony charge.

On the other hand, in the event

that a person is acting as a go-between or agent for a person who
sells drugs he should obviously be convicted of a felony•

However,

while an individual defendant should not be applauded for telling
third persons where they can obtain drugs, he should not be convicted of a felony unless he is actively involved.
CONCLUSION
The District Court for its Order of Dismissal should be
upheld and the Utah Supreme Court should reevaluate Section
58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, in
accordance with the foregoing in order to avoid further confusion
in this matter.
DATED this

^-t\A
/ ^ C J ^ pay of September, 1986.

Attorney f0r\defendant-Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING^
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the foregoing instrument to Mr« David L. Wilkinson, Attorney
Gen^sa^l236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
iy of September, 1986, postage prepaid.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

REVISED MEMORANDUM
DECISION.AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK RENFRO,

Case No. 9831

Defendant.

This matter came regularly before the Court for trial
on December 30, 1985.

The defendant had waived his right to

trial by jury; the trial was held before the bench.

The State of

Utah was represented by Deputy County Attorney Kent M. Barry, and
the defendant was present and represented by counsel Gregory M.
Warner.

The Court heard the evidence presented by the State, the

defendant offering no evidence and took the matter under
advisement.

The Court having reviewed the evidence and arguments

of counsel, its previous memorandum decision, and having further
reconsidered the motions and arguments of counsel, the Court
hereby enters the following findings and makes the following
order.
FINDINGS
1.

The Court finds from the evidence shown that the

Statefs witness, Jim Guynn, and another individual went to the
defendant's house in Orem, Utah County , Utah, on March 28, 1985,
for the purpose of purchasing marijuana.

2.

That while there, discussions were held, the

results of which were that the officer gave two fifty dollar
bills to the defendant in exchange for two small bags of
marijuana, which the defendant retrieved from his bedroom inside
the residence.
3.

The defendant was charged with the offense of

Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance for Value, arid
trial was held on that charge.

After the parties had both rested

their respective cases, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge
because of the State's failure to charge Distribution of a
Controlled Substance for Value, which he contended was the
specific charge governing such conduct, and the State made no
effort to amend the Information to that charge.
4.

The Court is persuaded that the evidence

establishes conduct which is clearly in violation of the statutes
of the State of Utah governing the Distribution for Value of
Controlled Substances (Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)), as defendant
contends, and that the defendant should have been charged under
that offense rather than with Arranging to Distribute a
Controlled Substance for Value (Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv).
ORDER
Because of the State's failure to properly charge the
defendant with the offense of Distribution for Value rather than
Arranging, the Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss and
hereby orders that the charge against the defendant in this case,
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance for Value, be
dismissed against this defendant and that he be discharged.

2-

DATED this o2 7

day of January, 1986.
BY T H E COURT:

.(Ztdfet.

CULLEN/tfT CHRISTENSEN
:<eT ci
DISTRICT
COURT JUDGE

APPENDIX "B"
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Cal.

357 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

PEOPLE, Respondent,
v.
Joseph BROWN, Appellant.

Cr. 6655.
Supreme Court of California
In Bank.
Dec. 22, 1060.

Prosecution for offering to sell heroin.
From adverse judgment of the Superior
Court, Los Angeles County, William E.
Fox, J., the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court held that admission by defendant that he had the stuff and was on
his way back but that the police rousted
him and he had to get rid of it, plus absence
of any evidence that his offer was false,
was sufficient to sustain his conviction.
Judgment and order denying motion
for new trial affirmed.
Opinion, 3 Cal.Rptr. 203, vacated.

1. Poisons <S=>4
In prosecution for offering to sell narcotics, a specific intent to sell a narcotic is
an essential clement of the crime of offering to make such a sale. West's Ann,
Health & Safety Code, § 11501.
2. Poisons <S=>4

Statute making it a crime to offer to
sell narcotics and to furnish a substitute
does not encompass an offer to sell a narcotic and the subsequent failure to deliver
anything. West's Ann.Health & Safety
Code, § 11503.
3. Statutes C=2I6
Legislative subcommittee's interpretation of an existing statute is not conclusive.
4. Poisons <S=»4
Under statute making it a crime to offer to sell narcotics, the requirement of a
direct, unequivocal act toward a sale necessary for an attempt to make a sale is not an
implied element of an offer to sell. West's
Ann.Health & Safety Code, §§ 11500, 11501,
11503.

5. Poisons <S=>9
In prosecution for offering to sell heroin, admission by defendant that he had the
stuff and was on his way back but that the
police rousted him and he had to get rid of
it, plus absence of any evidence that his offer was false, was sufficient to sustain his
conviction. West's Ann.Health & Safety
Code, §§ 11501, 11503.

Gerald L. Rosen, Los Angeles, for appellants.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., and William
E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
P E R CURIAM.
The trial court, sitting without a jury,
found defendant guilty of offering to sell
narcotics in violation of section 11500 (now
renumbered and hereafter called section
11501) of the Health and Safety Code. It
also found that he was previously convicted
of attempted robbery, denied his motion for
new trial, and sentenced him to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the term
prescribed by law. Defendant appeals.
The public defender represented defend*
ant at the trial, but did not undertake to do
so on appeal See Gov.Code, § 27706. Defendant requested the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, in
which the appeal was pending, to appoint
an attorney to represent him, claiming that
he was without funds to employ counsel.
The court made an independent investigation of the record, determined that representation by counsel would be of no benefit
to defendant or to the court, and denied the
request. See People v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d
152, 154, 331 P.2d 42. Defendant prepared
and filed a brief in propria persona. The
court affirmed the judgment. People v.
Brown, Cal.App., 3 Cal.Rptr. 203. We
granted defendant's petition for hearing in
this court and appointed counsel to represent him.
Officer Walton, an undercover narcotics
agent, had arranged to buy heroin from an
unidentified person and was awaiting delivery when defendant walked up to him and
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asked if he were a policeman. He replied
that he was not When defendant then
asked him what he was waiting for, he replied that he was expecting a delivery of
heroin. Defendant then left
While sitting in a bar the following
afternoon, Officer Walton saw defendant on
the street and called to him, and defendant
entered the bar. Officer Walton testified:
"I told him that I would like to know who
put the jacket on me, meaning who said
that I was a policeman; and the defendant
stated that he couldn't tell me that, but that
he didn't think I was a policeman because I
didn't look the type and I told him that I
wanted to get some stuff, meaning heroin;
and he stated that he could get it for me
but if I turned him in, well, the people
around that area would know who burned
him—meaning had him arrested." Officer
Walton told defendant that he did not want
to get burned again, meaning that he did
not want to part with his money without
receiving narcotics in return. Defendant
answered that if Officer Walton wanted
"it," he would have to take some risks.
Officer Walton then gave defendant $9 and
defendant left Officer Walton waited for
some time, but defendant did not return.
He saw defendant again three or four
days later and asked him why he had not
returned to the bar. Defendant answered
"that he had it and he was on his way back
but the police rousted him and he had to get
rid of it" He again encountered defendant
about a week and a half later and called to
him u [t]hat was a pretty dirty deal you
I. Section 11501 provides: "[e]xccpt as
otherwise provided in this division, every
person who transports, imports into tins
State, sells, furnishes, administers or
gives away, or offers to transport import into this State, sell, furnish, administer, or give away, or attempts to import into this State or transport any
narcotic other than marijuana except
upon the written prescription of a physician, dentist chiropodist, or veterinarian
licensed to practice in this State shall
be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or in
the state prison from five years to life.
357 P 2d—63

pulled on me the other day." Defendant
replied that he would speak to him later.
He did not see defendant again until his
arrest Defendant did not deliver heroin
or any other substance to Officer Walton
in return for the $9.
[1] In his briefs filed in the District
Court of Appeal, defendant contends that a
specific intent to sell narcotics is an essential element of the crime of offering to sell
narcotics under section 11501 of the Health
and Safety Code 1 and that this intent cannot be inferred from the making of the offer alone. He asserts that, the making of
such an offer is equally attributable to an
intent to obtain money by false pretenses.
His counsel makes the additional contention
that by proscribing offers to sell the Legislature in effect proscribed one form of attempts to sell and that therefore we must
look to the law of attempts to determine
whether an oral offer to sell constitutes an
attempt to sell. He asserts that the oral
offer and the taking of the money were only
preparation to making a sale and that neither was a direct, unequivocal act toward a
sale. See People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal2d 57,
66, 257 P.2d 29, and cases cited. Since in
his view such an act is an essential element
of the corpus delicti of an offer to sell within the meaning of section 11501, it cannot
be proved by defendant's extrajudicial admission standing alone that "he had it and
he was on his way back but the police rousted him and he had to get rid of it." See
People v. Duncan, 51 Cal.2d 523, 528, 334
P.2d 858; People v. McMonigle, 29 Cal.2d
730, 738, 177 P.2d 745.
"If such a person has been previously
convicted of any offense described in this
division or has been previously convicted
of any offense under the laws of any
other state or of the United States which
if committed in this State would have
been punishable as an offense described in
this division, the previous conviction shall
be charged in the indictment or information and if found to be true by the jury,
upon a jury trial, or if found to be true
by the court, upon a court trial, or is
admitted by the defendant, he shall be
imprisoned in the state pnsuu from 10
years to life."
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Both defendant's and his counsel's contentions are consistent with the position
taken by the Subcommittee on Narcotics of
the Assembly Interim Committee of the
Judiciary in 19S3 when it proposed the
adoption of two new sections of the Health
and Safety Code, only one of which was enacted. Section 11503 makes it a crime to
offer to sell a narcotic and then deliver a
substitute.2 Proposed section 11509 (section 10 of Assembly Bill No. 2243, 1953
Session) would have made it a crime to
offer to sell a narcotic coupled with the acceptance of money, even though there was
no delivery of anything.3
[2] In recommending the passage of
section 11503, the Subcommittee stated:
"[this section] will be entirely new law.
This will cover the individual who agrees to
sell, furnish, transport, or give away any
narcotic, and then delivers some other
liquid, substance or material. These individuals are known to be in a position to
violate the law; but, for some reason, they
may feel that they are dealing with a law
enforcement officer and thus deliver tobacco, water, or some other substance with the
result that they have had the intent to commit the crime but are testing out the officer.
At the present time nothing can be done to
that pcison, except to charge [him] with
'bunco' Under this statute, it provides a
penalty of not more than one year in the
county jail or in the state prison for 10
years " The Subcommittee thus made clear
2. Section 11503 provides that "[c]very
person who agrees, consents, or m any
manner offers to unlawfully sell, furnish,
transport, administer, or give away any
narcotic to any person, or offers, arranges, or negotiates to have any narcotic unlawfully sold, delivered, transported, furnished, administered, or given
to any person and then sells, delivers,
furuibhes, transports, administers, or
gi\es, or offers arranges, or negoti ites
to ha\e sold delivered, transported, furnished, administered, or given to any person any other liquid, substance, or material in lieu of anv naieotic sh ill bo
punished bv impnsoment in the county
jail for not more than one -soar or in
the state prison for not more than 10
years "

its view that section 11501 did not encompass an offer to sell a narcotic and subsequent delivery of a substitute. A fortiori
it would not encompass an otter to sell a
narcotic and subsequent failure to deliver
anything, which proposed section 11509 envisaged.
[3] Whether the Subcommittee's view
was based on the theory that an offer alone
to sell a narcotic is insufficient evidence of
a specific intent to make such a sale or on
the theory that offer means attempt and
that some additional act is required to constitute an attempt does not appear In any
event, the Subcommittee's interpretation of
the existing statute is not conclusive. Even
if it is assumed that by enacting section
11503 the Legislature impliedly excluded
the conduct therein proscribed from the
more inclusive language of section 11501,
it did not affect the scope of section 11501
in relation to defendant's conduct m this
case.
[4, 5] We agree with defendant's contention that a specific intent to sell a narcotic is an essential element of the crime of
offering to make such a sale under section
11501. See Pen Code, § 20; Matter of
Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 514-515, 114 P.
835, People v. Winston, 46 Cal 2d 151,
158; People v. Vogel, 46 Cal 2d 798, 801,
299 P 2d 850. In view, however, of defendant's subsequent admission that "he had
[the stuff] and he was on his way back but
3.

Proposed section 11500, as amended
March 9, 1953, read
"[ojvery person
^ho agrees, consents, or in anv manner
offers, to sell, deliver, furnish, transport,
administer, or give, or arranges or negotiates to have sold, delivered, furnished, transported, administered, or
given to any person any narcotic in violation of any provision of this division
and accepts any money, thing of value, or
other consideration in full or partial paymoit is guilty of a felon}, and upon conviction thereof shall be confined in the
county lail for not less than 60 days nor
more than one >tar, or in the state prison for not more than 5 years "
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the police rousted him and he had to get rid
of it," and the absence of any compelling
evidence that defendant's offer was false,
the trial court could reasonably conclude
that defendant meant what he said when he
stated to the officer that for $9 "he would
get it for me. * * * He would get the
stuff for me." Moreover, there is nothing
in section 11501 to support the contention
that an offer to sell means an attempt to
sell, for it proscribes both "offers to transport, import into this State, sell, furnish,
administer or give away" and "attempts to
import into this State or transport any narcotic * * *." By thus distinguishing bcI. The problem has attracted nation-wide
attention. The subcommittee to study
defender systems of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York and
the National Legal Aid Association concluded in their report. Equal Justice for
the Accused 61 (Doubleday, 1059) that
"[i]n addition to affording early representation, any defender system should
make provision for the continuance of
representation through appeal in appropriate cases. An appeal when grounds
exist is an inseparable part of the process through which the individual's guilt
or innocence of the charges brought
against him by the state is established.
Counsel is needed to assist with the determination of whether an appeal should
be taken and, if an appeal is taken, to
prepare and present it."
State practice varies. Two states require the appointment of counsel on appeal in all felony cases. (Indiana: State
ex rel. White v. Hilgcmann, 218 Ind. 572,
578, 34 N.E.2d 129; State ex rel. Grecco
•. Allen Circuit Court, 238 Ind. 571,
575, 153 N.E.2d 914; Wisconsin: Wis.
Stat Ann. § 957.2G(3), [if the court is
satisfied that "review is sought in good
faith and upon reasonable grounds"].)
In New York the appointment of counsel
on appeals turns upon whether the indigent defendant has a copy of the trial
minutes. If he does, no counsel is appointed (People v. Brcslin, 4 N.Y.2d 73,
80-87, 172 N.Y.S.2d 157, 149 N.E.2d 85);
otherwise appointment is mandatory
(People v. Kalan, 2 N.Y.2d 278, 280,
159 N.Y.S.2d 480, 140 N.E.2d 357; People v. Pitts, 6 N.Y.2d 288, 292-293, 189
N.Y.S.2d G50, 1G0 N.E.2d 523). Wyoming places discretion in the Supreme
Court to appoint counsel for indigent defendants "in any criminal matter or proceeding before said supreme court"

twecn offers and attempts the Legislature
made clear that the requirement of a direct,
unequivocal act toward a sale necessary for
an attempt to make a sale is not an implied
element of an offer to sell.
The judgment and the order denying the
motion for new trial are affirmed.
TRAYNOR, Justice (concurring).
I concur in the judgment It is my opinion, however, that the holding in People v.
Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42,
should be expanded to require the appointment of counsel on appeal for all indigent
defendants convicted of felonies. 1
Wyo.Stats.1957 § 7-8. Several states
appoint counsel at the trial who has discretion to appeal at public expense.
(Connecticut: State v. Klein, 95 Conn.
451, 453, 112 A. 524 [public defender];
State v. Zukauskas, 132 Conn. 450, 451452, 45 A.2d 289 note; Iowa: Iowa
Code Ann. tit 36 § 775.5 (1959 Pocket
Part), Tomlinson v. Monroe County, 134
Iowa 608, 610, 112 N.W. 100; Michigan:
Mich.StatAnn. § 28.1254, CompXaws
1948, 8 775.17; Minnesota: Minn.Stat
Ann. § 611.07, subd. 2 (1959 Pocket
Part) [Review must be sought "in good
faith and upon reasonable grounds/'
The provision may apply only when trial
counsel was appointed by the court, cf.
State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 390,
97 N.W.2d 472]; Mississippi: Miss.Code
Ann.1942 § 2505 [capital cases only];
Nevada: Nev.Rev.Stat. §5 177.065, subd.
2, 7.260; Pennsylvania: Penn.Stat.Ann.
tit. 19 § 1232.) Other states require appointment of counsel on appeal only in
capital cases. (Alabama: Ala.Code tit.
15 § 382(5) (1955 Pocket Part), [applied but not discussed in Monk v. State,
258 Ala. 603, 64 So.2d 588]; Florida:
Fla.StatAnn. § 909.21 (1959 Pocket
Part), [applied, McNeal v. Culver, Fla.,
113 So.2d 381, 383]; Georgia: Ga.Code
Ann. § 27-3002 (1958 Pocket Part); Illinois: Ill.Itev.Stat.1959, ch. 38 § 730a;
Kansas: Gen.Stat of Kan. § 62-1304
(1959 Supp.) (first degree murder only);
Nebraska: Rev.Stat. of Neb.1943 S§ 291803, 29-1804 (1959 Cum.Supp.); North
Carolina: Gen.Stat of No.Cur. § 15-181;
Oklahoma: Noel v. State, 17 Okl.Cr.
308, 318-322, 188 P. 688; Oregon: Ore.
Rev.Stat § 138.420 (1959 Replacement);
cf. Anonymous, 76 Me. 207 (1st case,
1884).) Three states refuse to appoint
counsel on appeal. Rhode Island: State
v. Hudson, 55 R.I. 141, 153, 179 A. 130,
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The question calls for resolution even
though we appointed counsel to represent
defendant in this court. The question cannot remain in abeyance. This very case
illustrates the recurring practice of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, of referring the question of
the appointment of counsel to the local bar
association committee (see People v. Logan,
137 Cal.App.2d 331, 332, 290 P.2d 11) and
the consequent countervailing practice of
this court to then grant a hearing, even on
its own motion, whenever there has been no
appointment of counsel. There would be
no end to such wasteful procedure were the
question deemed moot each time this court
granted a hearing and appointed counsel.
The question should be settled in the interest of effective appellate court administration. See Almassy v. L. A. County Civil
Service Com., 34 Cal.2d 387, 390, 210 P.2d
503; Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food
& Supply Co., 8 Cir., 141 F2d 331, 334335; People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,
411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, 772, 30 A.L.
R.2d 1132; State ex rel. Smith v. Smith,
197 Or. 96, 252 P.2d 550, 563; 103 U. of
Pa.L.Rev. 772, 783, 787-793; 132 A.L.R.
1185, 1186.
In Griffin v. People of State of Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.E& 891, the
Supreme Court of the United States held
that a state may not deny to a defendant,
on the sole ground that he cannot pay for
it, a stenographic transcript of the trial
proceedings when it is essential to effective
appellate review. The court declared that
although there is no constitutional right
to appeal, "that is not to say that a State
that does grant appellate review can do so
in a way that discriminates against some
convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become
an integral part of the Illinois trial system
for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Consequently at all
stages of the proceedings the Due Process
100 A.L.R. 313, followed, Lee v. Kindelan, 80 R.I. 212, 217-218, 95 A.2d 51,
certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 1000, 73 S.Ct
1146, 140<j; Tennessee: State ex rel.
Fisher v. Bomar, 201 Tenn. 579, 581,

and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious discriminations." Id., 351 U.S. at page 18,
76 S.Ct. at page 590.
Although this holding establishes only the
right to a transcript, it indicates the Supreme Court's concern to protect indigent
defendants against discriminatory consequences of their poverty. Denial of counsel
on appeal would seem to be a discrimination
at least as invidious as that condemned in
Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, supra.
See State v. Delaney, Or., 332 P.2d 71, 7481; The Effect of Griffin v. People of State
of Illinois on the States' Administration
of the Criminal Law, 25 U. of Chi.L.Rey.
161, 170-171; Appointment of Counsel for
Indigent Defendants in Criminal Appeals,
1959 Duke L.J. 484, 488-489. We need not
determine this constitutional question, however, for there are adequate independent
grounds for the conclusion that appellate
courts must appoint counsel on appeal for
all indigent defendants convicted of felonies.
Appointment of counsel is essential to
minimize hazards of affirming an erroneous
judgment, particularly in view of Rule 33
of the Rules on Appeal. This rule defines
"normal record" on appeal and "additional
record." If the defendant wants the record
on appeal to include matters that are part of
the "additional record," he must file "with
his notice of appeal an application describing the material which he desires to have included and the points on which he intends
to rely which make it proper to include it"
It is unreasonable to expect the average indigent defendant without counsel to obtain
an adequate record on appeal. He would
ordinarily be incarcerated, without access
to the trial court's files, and cut off from
consultation with his trial defense counsel,
the trial judge, the prosecutor, and other
witnesses to the trial. He would probably
be without access to law books and unable
300 S.W.2d 927; Texas: Spalding v.
State, 137 Tex.Cr. 329, 334, 127 S.W.2d
457; cf. State v. Singletary, 187 S.C. 19,
28, 196 S.B. 527.)
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to designate points that make it proper to
include an additional record. He would
probably be unaware of Rule 33, or so unfamiliar with it that he would fail to realize
that the normal record does not include rulings on motions, the voir dire examination
of jurors, the opening statements and arguments to the jury, comments on the evidence by the trial judge, instructions given
or refused, and rulings on the admissibility
of exhibits. He would not be alert, as
would an attorney, to possible reversible
errors therein even when they amounted to
a denial of constitutional rights. (See People v. Barrett, 207 Cal. 47, 49, 276 P. 1003,
[manner in which the trial judge conducted
the voir dire examination of the jurors
amounted to a denial of the constitutional
right to trial by jury].)
Even a court cannot make an adequate
review on less than the whole record. A
fortiori, an attorney called upon by a local
bar association and unknown to defendant
o r trial counsel cannot evaluate the merits
of an appeal on less than the whole record.
It is unpredictable how far an appellate
•court would advance toward a determination of the merits of an appeal by ordering
the preparation and transmission to it of
the whole record. In any event, it would
.then vitiate Rule 33, designed to avoid preparation and review of nonessential parts
of the record.
An appellate court can no more appropriately judge whether there is error requiring reversal without the benefit of counsel
than a trial court can decide the issues at
the trial without benefit of counsel. See
Kopasz v. Kopasz, 34 Cal.2d 423, 425, 210
P.2d 846. How then can it determine that
there is no error requiring appointment
of counsel? How can it undertake to dispense with counsel for indigents when it
is not free to dispense with counsel for
those who can afford them ? A court docs
not suddenly become omniscient when the
appellant proves impecunious. Thus in
People v. Tahtinen, 50 Cal.2d 127, 323 P.2d
442, this court was divided on the merits,
yet the attorney to whom the record was

referred by the local bar association committee at the instigation of the District
Court of Appeal thought there was no reasonable basis for an appeal, and that court
accordingly denied defendant's request for
appointment of counsel. In the present
case that court rejected the attorney's recommendation for appointment of counsel,
declaring that the appeal was "without [a]
semblance of merit." 3 Cal.Rptr. 203, 205.
Yet this court, after ordering a hearing
and appointing counsel, now finds that
there are substantial legal issues demanding careful research and analysis that
demonstrate the risk of fallibility of judgment without benefit of counsel's advocacy.
Moreover, appointment of counsel promotes effective appellate court administration. Denied counsel, defendants frequently file briefs in propria persona raising issues of little or no merit that still require
the Attorney General's answer and the
court's consideration. Often when a District Court of Appeal affirms the judgment,
a defendant files a petition for hearing in
this court that does not comply with Rules
28 and 29, which presuppose an orderly
presentation of the case before the District
Court of Appeal. When a defendant is
incapable of making such a presentation,
this court has a correspondingly heavy burden in reviewing his petition.
The court as well as defendant is more
likely to benefit from oral argument, as well
as from briefs presented by counsel rather
than by defendant in propria persona.
Moreover, the first alternative also avoids
possible complications of habeas corpus and
the transportation of defendant under
guard. There is no reason to forego these
advantages of argument by counsel, particularly when the defendant might be driven
to the second alternative to secure his right
to oral argument on appeal implicit in Rules
22 and 28(f) of the Rules on Appeal. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Adams, 19 Cal.2d 463, 467-468, 122
P.2d 257; see Pen.Code, § 1253; Witkin,
New California Rules on Appeal, 17 So.Cal.
L.Rev. 232, 243-244.
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The problem is not averted merely because Government Code, § 27706 makes it
the duty of the public defender to prosecute
appeals "where, in his opinion, the appeal
will or might reasonably be expected to
result in the reversal or modification of the
judgment of conviction." Comparable discretion vested in federal district judges is
subject to appellate review, and counsel
must be appointed to assist the defendant
in showing that his appeal has merit. Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566, 77
S.Ct. 550, 1 L.Ed.2d 593; see also Eskridge
v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214,
78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269; Farley v.
United States, 354 U.S. 521, 522-523, 77 S.
Ct. 1371, 1 L.Ed.2d 1529; see also People
v. Kalan, 2 N.Y.2d 278, 159 N.Y.S.2d 480,
140 N.E.2d 357, 358; State ex rel. White v.
Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E.2d 129,
131. Moreover, it sometimes happens that
defendants who were able to retain counsel
at the trial are indigent at the time of appeal. It would be capricious to make a defendant's right to appointment of counsel
on appeal depend on the chance that he was
represented by the public defender at the
trial.
In the interest, therefore, of orderly as
well as just review an appellate court
should appoint counsel upon the request of
an indigent defendant convicted of a felony.
Any implications to the contrary in People
v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42;
People v. Logan, 137 Cal.App.2d 331, 332333, 290 P2d 11; People v. McGrory, 137
Cal.App.2d 723f 724, 291 P.2d 43; People v.
Hamm, 145 Cal.App.2d 242, 244, 302 P.2d
345; and People v. Slater, 152 Cal.App.
2d 814, 815-816, 313 P2d 111, should be
disapproved.
Of course appointed counsel should not
present frivolous anneals. See, Ellis v.
United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675, 78 S.Ct.
974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060, discussed in Ercnhaft,
Indigent Appellants in the Federal Courts,
46 A.B.AJ. 616, 647; State ex rel. White
v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 57&-579, 34
2. In the two-week period from July 25,
1960 to August 5, I960, this court denied seven petitions for habeas corpus

N.E.2d 129. It is for counsel to make a
reasonable investigation, ordinarily involving consultation with the defendant, to iin~
sure consideration of meritorious grounds
of appeal. See United States v. Sevilk; 2
Cir., 174 F.2d 879, 880. Should he then
conclude that the appeal is frivolous, he
should so advise the court and the defendant He need not proceed with the appeal;
should the defendant insist on proceeding
with it, the court need not appoint new
counsel. People v. Tabb, 156 Cal.App2d
467, 471-472, 319 P.2d 656.
The reasons for appointment of counsel
on appeal from judgments of conviction !do
not extend to habeas corpus or other collateral attacks on final judgments of conviction unless the defendant presents a prima
facie case for relief. "This procedural requirement does not place upon an indigent
prisoner who seeks to raise questions :of
the denial of fundamental rights in propria
persona any burden of complying with technicalities ; it simply demands of him> a
measure of frankness in disclosing his tactual situation." In re Swain, 34 Cal2d 300,
304, 209 P.2d 793, 796. Our reluctancoto
consider even constitutional question*t^on
habeas corpus if they could have teen
raised on appeal (see In re Dixon, 41 CaL2d
756, 759-761, 264 P.2d 513) makes it ai**he
more important to afford defendants affair
opportunity to challenge their convictions
on appeal.
Appointment of counsel on appeal should
reduce applications for post-conviction remedies in the federal courts as well as our
own.* As the report of July 5, 1960, of the
Habeas Corpus Committee of the National
Association of Attorneys General points
out, the states can largely obviate reviewrof
their decisions in criminal cases by federal
district courts on habeas corpus petitions by
providing adequate state remedies.
This discussion is limited to felonies because of the substantially less serious nature
of misdemeanors and their correspondingly
lighter penalties. See Pen.Code, §§ 17-19U.
from the same prisoner, who had taken
his appeal in propria persona.
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The misdemeanant suffers no loss of civil
rights. See Pen.Code, §§ 2600, 2601. He is
entitled to bail as a matter of right after
conviction pending appeal. Pen.Code, §
1272. Any incarceration is likely to be
brief. Frequently a misdemeanant is penalized only by fine, often payable in installments. See Pen.Code, § 1205. The court
may grant probation summarily (Pen.Code,
§ 1203b) to the misdemeanant or permit him
to serve time on weekends or at times when
he is not working. With earning capacity
thus maintained he may be able to employ
-counsel. Most misdemeanants are willing
to forfeit bail or pay the fines and find it
unnecessary to employ counsel or request
trial. There is hence not the urgency for
making appointment of counsel on appeal
for indigent misdemeanants mandatory instead of discretionary.
PETERS and DOOLING, JJ., concur.
SCHAUER, Justice (concurring).
I concur only in the judgment. I am
impelled to point out that the discussion, in
the opinion by the court (at page 817
of 9 Cal.Rptr., at page 1073 of 357 P.2d), of
purported interpretation of section 11501 of
the Health and Safety Code by the 1953
proposal of legislation, expression of views
by an assembly subcommittee, and adoption
of section 11503 (former section 11502, enacted in 1953) by the Legislature, is neither
necessary nor appropriate. The argument
concerning these matters was not advanced
either by defendant in pro. per. or by counsel appointed for him, but originated in this
court. The notion that these matters which
occurred in 1953 could evidence what the
Legislature meant when it created the crime
of offering to sell a contraband narcotic in
1909 l appears to me so obviously lacking in
merit as not to warrant inclusion in an appellate opinion; rather, such notion appears
4. I?y a 1JM>9 amendment of section 8 of the
1007 Poison Act the Legislature for the
first time made it unlawful to "offer to
sell, furnish or give away" narcotics except under certain conditions.
Stats.
1909, ch. 1*79, § 4. Since then each of

to be stated for no other purpose than to
refute it.
The contention made by counsel appointed for defendant by this court—that the
word "offer" in section 11501 means "attempt" as defined by the law of crimes—is
in effect a more sophisticated version of the
argument advanced by defendant in pro.
per. before the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, Division Three. That
court, speaking through Presiding Justice
Shinn (People v. Brown (1960, Cal.App.),
3 Cal.Rptr. 203, 204, 205), stated defendant's contention as made in pro. per. as follows : "that the word 'offer' should be construed to mean 'bring, bear, or carry/ and
since it was not even shown there was a
narcotic in existence which could have been
the subject of an offer, commission of the
charged offense was not proved." Without
in so many words rejecting defendant's contention as to the meaning of "offer," the
District Court of Appeal correctly held that
"Appellant's [defendant's] statement that
he had 'it' was sufficient as proof that the
heroin was in his possession and that he had
the ability to perform his promise."
Now this court, after lengthy consideration of this simple case, comes to the same
conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evidence—the only possible conclusion under
any normal theory of appellate review.
The only contribution to the law in the
opinion by the court is the decision that the
Legislature, when it proscribed both "offers" and "attempts," referred to two different sorts of criminal conduct.
In the circumstances it is obvious that the
District Court of Appeal properly determined, on the basis of its own examination
of the record, that "representation by counsel would be of no benefit to the appellant or
to the court" and correctly held that "There
is no merit in the appeal." (People v.
the series of acts which have denounced
narcotics offenses hafl contained a provision similar to that of such amended section 8 or the comparable provision of
the here pertinent section 11501 of the
Health and Safety Code.
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Brown (1960, Cal.App.), supra, 3 Cal.Rptr.
203, 204.)
It seems proper to note that the majority
"By the Court" opinion states (at page
816 of 9 Cal.Rptr., at page 1072 of 357 P.2d)
that "Defendant requested the District
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division
Three, in which the appeal was pending, to
appoint an attorney to represent him, claiming that he was without funds to employ
counsel. The court made an independent investigation of the record, determined that
representation by counsel would be of no
benefit to defendant or to the court, and denied the request. (See People v. Hyde, 51
Cal.2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42.) • * *
We granted defendant's petition for hearing in this court and appointed counsel
to represent him."
It appears proper to note also that the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor
states (at page 819 of 9 Cal.Rptr., at page
1075 of 357 P.2d), "I concur in the judgment. It is my opinion, however, that the
holding in People v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152,
154, 331 P.2d 42, should be expanded to require the appointment of counsel on appeal
for all indigent defendants convicted of felonies."
"The question calls for resolution even
though we appointed counsel to represent
defendant in this court. The question cannot remain in abeyance. This very case illustrates the recurring practice of the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division Three, of referring the question of
the appointment of counsel to the local bar
association committee (see People v. Logan,
137 Cal.App.2d 331, 332, 290 P.2d 11) and
the consequent countervailing practice of
this court to then grant a hearing, even on
its own motion, whenever there has been
no appointment of counsel. There would
be no end to such wasteful procedure were
the question deemed moot each time this
court granted a hearing and appointed
counsel. The question should be settled in
the interest of effective appellate court administration."
It seems appropriate further to note that
the question was settled by the holding in

People v. Hyde (1958), 51 Cal.2d 152, 154
[1], 331 P.2d 42 and that the District Court
of Appeal in the present case complied with
that holding.
From what has been quoted above from
the opinions of the majority and of Justice
Traynor it appears proper to infer that the
granting of a hearing in the case at bench
was influenced at least in part by the view
of the specially concurring justice. If such
inference is properly drawn it seems obviously appropriate to observe that although
counsel appointed by this court performed
his duties faithfully and ably, the appointment of an attorney for the defendant has
not aided such defendant or furthered the
proper administration of justice. The only
thing which the granting of a hearing accomplished has been a delay in final determination of this case and additional expense to the state.
McCOMB, J., concurs.
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In re Larry Wayne McLAIN, on
Habeas Corpus.
Cr. 6714.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Dec. 27, I960.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 25,1961.
Proceeding on habeas corpus by state
prisoner claiming that he is being illegally
retained. The Supreme Court, Peters, J.,
held that where Adult Authority had previously fixed prisoner's term at 7 years and
granted probation at a time to commence
in future but subsequently revoked prior
action because based on record before Authority prisoner had been found guilty
of complicity in knifing of fellow prisoner,
good cause was shown for revocation of
both parole and prior sentence, and such
sentence until Authority fixed it at a lesser
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§ 11351

UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

Div. 10

Note 48
ciimstiiiiccs bave been futile in p r o s e c u t i o n
for p o s s e s s i o n oi heroin for s a l e nml poss e s s i o n of marijuana.
P e o p l e v. Zavala
(1!HI(I) 4!) Cnl.Hptr. 11511. 2TUI <\A.2«1 T.'I'J.
, .
.
.
, ,
l-.ven though defendant, w h o pleaded
guilty to c r i m e of p o s s e s s i n g heroin, s l i p tiltifofl that court could d e t e r m i n e lit time
of probation nml Hcntcticc hearing w h e t h e r
p o s s e s s i o n admitted by defendant wits for
p u r p o s e of sale, it w a s improper for
eourt, a p p a r e n t l y acting upon material
contained in probation report, to "find"
defendant guilty of more s e r i o u s crime of
p o s s e s s i o n for p u r p o s e s of sale.
People
v. B r a v o (1JKI5) 4<1 Cnl.Itptr. 1121, 2 3 7 C.

A.2d 4.'n.

Refusal to permit •lffoii«lniil*s to e m i f m vert f a r t s rHieil upon hv prosecution to
justify i s s u a n c e of s e a r c h warrant u*ei| to
obtain iiicritniuatiiij: evidence UMM! against
d e f e n d a n t s in p r o s e c u t i o n for p o s s e s s i n g
lirroin for sale w a s error requiring i c v e r
,.
| v , ( . r M n I I (UMiTo 4'A f:.l.
s;||<
|||t y
| ( . , | r # 157. 2X\ <* A.LM 4M|.
Police officer's reference in presence of
jury lo sale of narcotics by defendant
charged with p o s s e s s i n g narcotics w a s tint
prejudicial ami did not deny defendant fair
trial in view of farts that defense first
elicited r e f e r e n c e to selling narcotics from
officer ami then pursued the subject.
People v. K s t r a d a (IWITO 41 ('al.Hptr.
r

ia i, 2.u (\A.2«I i;:«. n

A.I*K.:UI I:U>-.

§ 11352.

Transportation, sale, giving away, etc. of designated
controlled substances; punishment; prior convictions
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this division, every person
who transports, imports into this state, sells, furnishes, administers,
or gives away, or offers to transport, import into this state, sell, furnish, administer, or give away, or attempts to import into this state
or transport (1) any controlled substance specified in subdivision (b)
or (c) of Section 11054, specified in paragraph (11), (12), or (17) of
subdivision (d) of Section 11054, or specified in subdivision (b) or
(c) of Section 11055, or (2) any controlled substance classified in
Schedule III, IV, or V which is a narcotic drug, unless upon the written prescription of a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or veterinarian licensed to practice in this state, shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for a period of five years to life and shall not be eligible for release upon completion of sentence or on parole or any other basis until he has been imprisoned for a period of not less than
three years in the state prison.
(b) If such person has been previously convicted once of any offense described in subdivision (d), the previous conviction shall be
charged in the indictment or information and, if found to be true by
the jury upon a jury trial or by the court upon a court trial or if admitted by the person, he shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a
period of 10 years to life and shall not be eligible* for release upon
completion of sentence or on parole* or any other basis until he has
l>oen imprisoned for a period of not less than 10 years in the state
prison.
(c) If such person has been previously convicted two or more
times of any offense described in subdivision (d), the previous convictions shall be charged in the indictment or information and, if found
to be true by the jury upon a jury trial or b\ the court upon a court
trial or if admitted by the person, he shall be imprisoned in the state
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prison for a period of 15 years to life and shall not be eligible for release upon completion of sentence or on parole or any other basis until he has been imprisoned for a period of not less than 15 years in
the state prison.
(d) Any previous conviction of any of the following offenses, or
of an offense under the laws of another state or of the United States
which, if committed in this state, would have been punishable as such
an offense, shall be charged pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c) of this
section:
(1) Any felony offense described in Section 11378, 11379, or
31380.
(2) Any felony offense described in this division involving a controlled substance specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11054,
specified in paragraph (10), (11), (12), or (17) of subdivision (d) of
Section 11054, or specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11055.
(3) Any felony offense described in this division involving a narcotic drug classified in Schedule III, IV, or V.
(Addtni by Stats.1972, c. 14U7, p. 3013, § 3. Amended by Stats.1073. c.
1078, p. 2173, § 4, efi*. Oct. 1, 11)73.)
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APPENDIX "D"

§ 11355

UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

Div. 10

§ 11355.

Sale or furnishing substance falsely represented to be
a controlled substance; punishment
Every person who agrees, consents, or in any manner offers to
unlawfully sell, furnish, transport, administer, or give (1) any controlled substance specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11054,
specified in paragraph (10), (11), (12), or (17) of subdivision (d) of
Section 11054, or specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11055
or, (2) any controlled substance classified in Schedule III, IV, or V
which is a narcotic drug to any person, or offel's, arranges, or negotiates to have any such controlled substance unlawfully sold, delivered,
transported, furnished, administered, or given to any person and then
sells, delivers, furnishes, transports, administers, or gives, or offers,
arranges, or negotiates to have sold, delivered, transported, furnished, administered, or given to any person any other liquid, substance, or material in lieu of any such controlled substance shall be
punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year, or in the state prison for not more than 10 years.
(Added by Stats.1972, c. 1407, p. 3014, § 3. Amended by Stats.1973, c. 1078,
p. 2176, § 7, eff. Oct. 1. 1973).
Historical Note
The 1073 amendment designated conditions (1) and (2): inserted in the first
condition the words "specified in sul>division (|i) or (e) of section 110.r»| or specified in subdivision in paragraph (10),
(11), (12) or (17) of subdivision (d) of
section 11054. or specified in subdivision
(b) or (c) of section 110.V> or/*; substituted the words "any controlled substance
classified in Schedule 111, IV, or V which
is a nareotie drug to any person, or offers, arranges, or negotiates to have any
such controlled substance" for "any controlled substance classified in Schedule 1

or 11 to any person, or offers, nminxes.
or negotiates to have any controlled substance classified in Schedule I or 11" at
tin* beginning of condition (12) ; and. substituted the words "such controlled sub
stance" for the words "any controlled
substance classified in Schedule I or II"
near the end of the second condition.
Resentencing for violations between
March 7. H)73. and October 1. 1!>73. sec
1 listorieal Note under section 113."0.
Derivation: Former section IITrfh't, added by Stats.liKW. c 111L\ p. 3W4. $ t».

Cross References
Arrest of alien for violation of this section, notice to federal agency, see $ 113<>it.
Conviction of aliens, notice to federal agency, sec § 11W>0.
Denial of probation or suspension of sentence after conviction of violation of this section, prior conviction of certain offenses, see $ 11370.
Kxpcnditurcs to secure evidence, see $ 11-br>4.
Fine in addition to imprisonment for conviction of violation «»f this section, sec tj 1137'2.
Xarcotics offense defined as violation of this section for purposes of Kducatiou Code,
see Kducatiou Code $ 1*21)1 !!.!">.
Probation or suspension of sentence, previous convictions, see $ 11370.
Recovery of funds expended in investigations, see $ 11 Td»1.
Kepis? ration a< controlled substance offender, conviction of offense defined in this section, see $ 1 l."i!MI et se<j.
School employees, notice to sehool authorities upon arrest for violation of this section.

see § nr»oi.
Library References
1 Tups IIIKI Narcotics C=H»K, 133.

C I S . 1 >rugs and Narcotics $$ 1<*.J, )i\7),
]<;7. KIN. 173. 22o to 2 3 .
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453.323

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

(c) For a third or subsequent offense, or if the offender has previously
been convicted two or more times of violating this section or of any
offense under the laws of the United States or any state, territory or district which, if committed in this state, would amount to a violation of
this section, by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for a definite
period of not less than 5 years nor more than 20 years and may be further punished by a fine of not more than $ 10,000 for each offense.
5. The court shall not grant probation to or suspend the sentence of
any person convicted under subsection 4 and punishable pursuant to
paragraph (b) or (c) of subsection 4.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 2018; A 1973, 1213, 1372; 1977, 1411)
453.323 Offenses and penalties: Prohibited acts "C"; penalties.
1. Any person who offers, agrees or arranges unlawfully to sell, supply, transport, deliver, give or administer any controlled substance classified in NRS 453.161 or 453.171 and then sells, supplies, transports,
delivers, gives or administers any other substance in place of such controlled substance shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than 1 year or in the state prison for not less than 1 year nor
more than 10 years and may be further punished by a fine of not more
than $10,000 for each offense.
2. The court shall not grant probation to or suspend the sentence of
any person convicted of violating subsection 1 if he has previously been
convicted of any felony offense under the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act or of any offense under the laws of the United States or any state, territory or district which, if committed in this state, would amount to a felony under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.
3. Any person who offers, agrees or arranges unlawfully to sell, supply, transport, deliver, cive or administer any controlled substance classified in NRS 453.181^ 453.191 or 453.201 and then sells, supplies,
transports, delivers, gives or administers any other substance in place of
such controlled substance shall be punished by imprisonment in the
county jail for not more than 1 year or in the state prison for not less
than 1 year nor more than 6 years and may be further punished by a
fine of not more than $5,000 for each offense.
(Added to NRS by 1977, 1408)
453.326 Offenses and penalties: Prohibited acts "D"; penalties.
1. It is unlawful for any person:
(a) To refuse or fail to make, keep or furnish any record, notification,
order form, statement, invoice or information required under the provisions of NRS 453.01J to 453.551, inclusive; or
(b) To refuse an entry into any premises for any inspection authorized
by the provisions of NRS 453.011 to 453.551, inclusive; or
(c) Knowingly to keep or maintain any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling, building, vehicle, boat, aircraft or other structure or place which is
resorted to by persons using controlled substances in violation of the provisions of NRS 453.01 1 to 453.551, inclusive, for the purpose of using
these substances, or which is used for keeping or selling them in violation
of such sections.
0977)
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APPENDIX "F"

In the Fourth Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah
In and For Utah County
ME STATE OF UTAH,

^

^

"

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NUMBER
DATED

3ARY DALE JACOBSEN,

Defendant

\

7062

August 2 5 , 1978
J - Robert Bullock,

JUDGE

RULING

Having heard the arguments of counsel and having read and considered the
aemoranda filed herein, the Court now orders that the Information be quashed upon
±e ground and for the reason that it does not allege an offense.
The Court is of the opinion that an offense occurs under Section 58-37-8
'1) (a) (iv) U.C.A., 1953 as amended, if and only if a particular controlled
substance is arranged to be sold, and that some other substance is substituted
JI lieu thereof.

:c:

Noall T. Wootton
Gregory M. Warner

